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Introduction
Background and Summary of the Study
UNTIL quite recently, money and banking ranked fairly low
among the features of socialist economies investigated by West-
ern analysts, who generally tended to assign money and credit a
subordinate role in achieving policy objectives in socialist coun-
tries. Many studies of the Soviet economy almost ignore money
and credit and accord only tangential importance, if any, to the
banking system and the monetary plans it implements. Other
students of the Soviet scene, observing the impressive degree of
price stability since the middle fifties, have concluded that the
successful management of money must have contributed to main-
taining stability and growth, and, in particular, to avoiding the
surges in speculative consumer buying that have plagued some
other socialist countries. In the latter view, the contribution of
monetary management surely goes beyond servicing the credit
needs of the economy's socialist sector and adjusting the volume
of currency in circulation to the growth in disposable consumer
income.
These two views are not altogether contradictory. Even official
disclaimers to the effect that monetary management pursues no
objectives other than implementation of the plan are compatible
with the conclusion that—at least since World War Il—it has
played an important, if subordinate, part in an overall economic
policy aimed at price stability and maximization of financial
resources available to support economic growth. The Soviet
authorities have been much more successful in controlling the
quantity and distribution of money to prevent undesired accumu-
lation of purchasing power than in developing a credit policy to
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strengthen incentives and generally improve the performance of it evolved throu
the economic system. tion which
Evaluating the contribution of money and of monetary and system, some
credit planning to the overall performance of the Soviet economy Tsarist regime.
is a complex problem. Trying to answer this broad question would the centrally di
involve assessing such aspects of economic performance as opti- all-encompassi
mal investment patterns, distribution of income, social mobility, tial features—
the loss resulting from inadequate use of pecuniary awards, and commercial ba
the stifling influence of bureaucracy, as well as the cost of various torical backgr
disutiities (such as pollution) associated with the growth over involvement 0:
time of selected output and income indicators. The result of any day-to-day
such assessment, in terms of intertemporal or intersystem corn- considered an
parisons, will depend to a certain extent on the scope of the Interestingly
performance indicators chosen. These need not be confined to Soviet financia
GNP, industrial production, the rate of increase in investment or vociferous noi
personal consumption, or any combination of these. Price stabil- marginal influe
ity would rank high among the indicators likely to be included in of 1917. Theii
any such overall assessment. The specific role of money and other arrangements
financial variables in such an evaluation will depend on the signifi- cusses these v
cance attached to the contribution of each of these variables banks in the 5(
toward achieving the end results under review. thenationaliz
This monograph does not attempt to assess the contribution of after the Oct
the Soviet Union's financial structure and policy to the growth of review of the
its economy. My more limited objective here is to identify the role history of Soi
of money, credit, and financial flows in the Soviet economy and to regime and
bring out differences in techniques, as well as similarities in credit reforms
functions, between its monetary and financial arrangements and reform of
those in the United States and many other Western countries. The balance
Since the Soviet Union has served as a prototype for all centrally standard finarn
directed economies, in Eastern Europe as well as in Asia, the the unified bu
discussion has a broad application. Chapter 3 C
The monetary and banking system which has emerged after the economy, beg
credit reforms of 1930—1932 remains basic to the economic struc- goes on to
ture of the Soviet Union. The monobank-monobudget system planning proc
created in the early thirties was a pioneering move by the first Monetary n
socialist country to provide an optimal financial structure for part of an int
stimulating planned economic growth. I have referred to this
system in other publications as the "standard system."1 Although
mentioned. Referer































Background and Summary of the Study 3
it evolved through the largely politically-determined experimenta-
tion which was characteristic of the first decade of the Soviet
system, some of its distinctive features can be traced back to the
Tsarist regime. There are interesting parallels between the role
the centrally directed economy assigns to the "monobank"—the
all-encompassing bank that is one of the present system's essen-
tial features—and the role of Tsarist Russia's State Bank and
commercial banking system. Chapter 2, which considers the his-
torical background of the present system, reviews the deep
involvement of the Tsarist government with the creation and the
day-to-day operations of the Russian banking system, which it
considered an important tool of economic development.
Interestingly enough, some of the principles embodied in the
Soviet financial and banking system were advocated by a group of
vociferous non-Marxist Russian economists and publicists of
marginal influence during the last decade preceding the revolution
of 1917. Their proposals were of note similar to the banking
arrangements that emerged in the Soviet state. Chapter 2 dis-
cusses these views and probes into Lenin's views on the role of
banks in the socialist transformation of society, which resulted in
the nationalization and unificationof banking immediately
after the October Revolution. The chapter concludes with a
review of the Soviet monetary experience and the checkered
history of Soviet banking between the collapse of the Tsarist
regime and the establishment of the "standard system" with the
credit reforms of 1930—1932 and of those features of the economic
reform of 1965 which affect financial firms.
The balance of the monograph is devoted to a discussion of the
standard financial system with its twin pillars—the monobank and
the unified budget.2
Chapter 3 considers the role of money in a centrally planned
economy, beginning with a review of Soviet monetary theory. It
goes on to describe the integration of monetary control with the
planning process.
Monetary management in the Soviet Union must be viewed as
part of an integrated financial policy in which concern with the
2Among the various changes in credit and banking arrangements in the intervening
period, only those that have broad significance or have survived up to now will be
mentioned. References are provided, however, whenever possible, to original sources in
which changes superseded by subsequent developments are described in greater detail.4 Introduction Bac
real outcome of the economic process requires decisions of
options, relating to levels and structure of prices and taxation or
forced versus voluntary savings, for instance, that may involve
money and credit only in an implementary way. In the context of
-Sovieteconomic policy, monetary management replaces mone-
tary policy. Management of money is part of an overall financial
strategy. It involves direct determination (referred to in the Soviet
Union as "planning" and "control") rather than indirect regula-
tion of the quantity and use of money and credit.
However, the crucial difference between the Soviet Union and
nonsocialist countries is not the absence of mechanisms linking
extension of credit and thus the creation of money to liquidity of
banks or the use of interest rates as a means of controlling the
volume and the use of credit, but, rather, the basically different
role assigned to money and credit for achieving economic goals.
The implementary role of credit and the derivative nature of
money flows are inherent in a system in which production objec-
tives are stipulated in physical terms, and money and credit are
supplied in quantities and through channels designed to achieve
output patterns and uses determined by planners. Money is
needed as the universal accounting equivalent and as a medium
for achieving planners' objectives with greater flexibility than
direct barter would permit. At the same time, in the socialized
sector, money cannot be permitted to interfere with planners'
intentions. It can become effective only jointly with goods orders
(vouchers) issued to implement plan objectives. Conversely, plan-
ners determine the level of cash balances appropriate for each
individual enterprise and adjust these balances through loans,
grants, and subsidies, as well as through transfers from or to other
units.
During the last decade, Soviet monetary theoreticians have
gradually recognized that writings by Marx could not serve as
ready-made guides for a socialist economy, since their point of
reference was a very early stage in the development of the
capitalist credit and financial system. They are still far from
having developed a monetary theory for a socialist society.3
30n the difference between the Soviet and the Western approach to monetary analysis,
see Hodgman in Holzman [122], pp. 105—106. The following remark by Gekker is also
relevant: "The paucity of data in the field of price and monetary statistics invited specula-
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Many of the changes introduced by the 1965 Reform4 grew out
of dissatisfaction with the way credit and financial processes
functioned under the standard system. Chapter 3 concludes with a
discussion of the developments leading to the Reform and the
modifications to the credit system it introduced.
Chapter 4 is devoted to a description of the banking system.
The monobank system centered on the State Bank (Gosudar-
stvennyi Bank, usually abbreviated as Gosbank) now also incor-
porates the savings bank system.5 While the State Bank as such
deals with virtually all parts of the economy (kolkhozes—collec-
tivefarms—as well as state enterprises) and the various govern-
ment units, savings bank offices, which have been an integral part
of the State Bank for more than a decade, serve primarily the
needs of households. This chapter also discusses the activities of
the Investment Bank which have been much curtailed by the
Reform. But even prior to the Reform this institution had few
functions other than serving as the Treasury's disbursing and
supervisory agent for all nonreturnable grants, which were the
only outside source for financing fixed investment. So far, the
reforms launched in 1965 have not materially affected banking
structure, although they have increased, actually and potentially,
the role of the banking system in channeling outside investment
funds—reserved to the budget since the creation of the Soviet
state.
The interaction of the financial system with the major sectors of
the Soviet economy: governmental, state enterprise, household,
agricultural, and foreign, is treated in Chapters 5,6,and 7.
The physical as well as functional separation of enterprise
money from household money is one of the basic aspects of
finance in the Soviet economy. Much of the activity of the State
Bank is focused on preventing spillovers from one kind of money
into another. The monetization of economic relations between the
state and the kolkhozesinthe middle 1950s has generalized the
use of money without significantly undermining "control by the
which we use for measuring and judging the performance of the Soviet economy" [161].
Some of the limitations of monetary data are discussed in Appendix B. All numbers refer to
the bibliography.
4Throughout this monograph, whenever the first letter of is capitalized,
reference is made to the sum total of the reform measures.
5The State Bank's internal structure is described in greater detail in Appendix A.6 Introduction Bac
ruble,"whichis one of the basic means through which the financial resour4
performance of the Soviet economy is monitored. providing for or
In the Soviet Union, the choice between money and near- ditures typical f
money is not open to enterprises and exceedingly limited for countries.
households. Liquidity is not a major consideration entering enter- The credit
prise decisions. The significance of money in the accounts of 1930—1932 is d
socialist enterprises is fundamentally different from that of cash only relatively
balances in firms in nonsocialist countries. Administrative trans- and procedural
fers of cash balances between enterprises diminish an enterprise's to credit.
interest in using them more efficiently and in releasing cash by In the Soviel
minimizing inventories and other nonfinancial forms of working economic funct
capital. microeconomic
The money and credit system which took shape in the early ing enterprises
thirties, and underwent only marginal changes in the following planned invent
forty years, has proven to be a workable technical solution for an Foreign finat
economy in which achievement of optimal resource allocation in Chapter 7.
and maximum productivity are sought through administrative important aspe
decisions rather than market-oriented processes. Within this sys- East-West trad
tern, various organizational alternatives are available. These alter- area.
natives are limited, however, because the concepts of money as The same cci
an absolute carrier of options and the discretionary extension of prise sector frc
credit are incompatible with a centrally planned and administra- the domestic ei
tively directed economy. Money as an absolute claim on import prices, f
resources would conifict with all-encompassing planning in physi- prices. The difi
cal terms. In the household sector, however, with the fairly rapid West and with
increase in real incomes after the initial period of post-World War in Chapter 7, a
II reconstruction, money savings of households did emerge as a COMECON.
new factor, severing the previously rigid link between receipts In Chapter
and disbursements of income. Expanding domestic travel and Here, the abi]
internal migration also required more sophisticated planning of aggregate equil
the availability of goods and services in the areas where incomes sidered. While
were spent but not earned. But so far neither the accumulation of ing monetary ai
household purchasing power "on the wing" nor the use of redun- performance
dant enterprise balances in ways that might conflict with planners' economies.
intentions have presented serious problems. For one thu
Chapter 5 describes the institutional arrangements that assure subjected to 1
theseparation of the two money circuits and briefly touches upon applied torio
the role of financial planning in adjusting the level of both flows to bThus, for instant
the requirements of a growing and changing economy. It also Moorsteen and Powe
reviews the role of the unified budget in the centralization of
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financial resources for economic purposes while at the same time
providing for ordinary administrative and other budgetary expen-
ditures typical for the various levels of government in nonsocialist
countries.
The credit system that emerged from the reforms undertaken in
1930—1932 is dealt with in Chapter 6. Since then it has undergone
only relatively small changes, mostly of a purely organizational
and procedural nature and not affecting the original role assigned
to credit.
In the Soviet economy, extension of credit is denied a macro-
economic function and is, in the main, related to the attainment of
microeconomic goals. Credit has been mainly a means of provid-
ing enterprises with the financial resources necessary to carry
planned inventories, and .to finance the collection gap.
Foreign financi4l relations of the Soviet Union are considered
in Chapter 7. Although foreign trade is not among the most
important aspects of the Soviet economy, recent developments in
East-West trade have focused a great deal of attention on this
area.
The same central direction of production that isolates the enter-
prise sector from the direct influence of market forces removes
the domestic economy from international pressures. Export and
import prices, for example, bear little relation to relative domestic
prices. The difference between the ways in which trade with the
West and with other socialist countries is conducted is discussed
in Chapter 7, as are the international financial institutions of the
COMECON.
In Chapter 8 the focus shifts to the macroeconomic aspects.
Here, the ability of the Soviet monetary system to maintain
aggregate equilibrium and minimize inflationary pressures is con-
sidered. While the problems are broadly similar to those confront-
ing monetary authorities in the West, Soviet monetary policy and
performance cannot be analyzed on the same basis as in market
economies.
For one thing, the Soviet monetary performance cannot
subjected to the kind of quantitative macroanalysis usually
applied to nonsocialist economies,6 where monetary actions
6Thus, for instance, Soviet inventory data are estimated largely from bank loans (see
Moorsteen and Powell [134]): therefore, correlating inventories with loans would be based
on basically identical data. It is worth noting that for China, where loan data are not8 Introduction
affect spending units through changes in liquidity and the cost and upheaval betwL
availability of credit as well as through the consequent changes in Soviet currency
expectations generated. In such economies, the demand for credit reforms
money is related to yields on near-money and other financial Chapter 8 desci
assets. Whether their monetary authorities pursue a passive or an periods the fire
active policy, its results are reflected in changes in the quantity of 1947, were chiu
money and interest rates. Even when a country's policy target is ing rates. The
the money supply (however defined), changes in the supply of reforms of 193
money in relation to changes in the demand for it—together with marked for
the related changes in the expectations engendered—will be tionary pressur
reflected in the level and structure of interest rates. contrast, after t
In the Soviet Union, because of the separation of the payment nate the war-g
streams into two compartments and the considerable differ- markets alimer
ences between the functions of money in these two circuits, the kolkhoz farmer
concept of total money supply has only limited analytical signifi- stores as well.
cance. Manipulation of the total quantity of money (as contrasted towed by virtu
with currency in circulation) is not a policy objective. Standard from a
Western analytical models for testing monetary aspects of eco-
nomic processes are not applicable to the Soviet reality, both
because of the basic differences in the role of motivation in the
behavior of enterprises and the lack of the necessary data.
Furthermore, in the Soviet Union the basic problem of a rapidly Despite the ap
growing economy—inflationary pressures—is not dealt with pri- keeping inflath
marily through monetary policy. Instead, administrative controls bounds and ofi
are applied in combination with credit, budgetary, and income system's inabi]
policies, which tends to mask the basic macroeconomic objective: incentives to it
to regulate monetary demand in the household sector in relation ments not anticl
to the projected increase in the availability of consumer goods and 1965 was ini
services, announced at ti
While the lack of relevant statistical data and the complications actually implei
arising from the simultaneous existence of several consumer mar- modest advanc
kets with different price levels preclude detailed analysis, a broad some of the in'
review of Soviet monetary experience is presented. The period of for the failure
and suggests
available,K. H. Hsiao [123]used the reverse procedure, estimating bank loans from The exampk
inventory data. By contrast, in some socialist countries, including China, relevant data on
the money supply and its composition and ownership are available for at least some limited a
periods. This permits some quantitative explorations, including the construction and testing socialist monel
of models of inflationary processes originating in wage drift, activation of household trail" directed balances, excessive accumulation of inventories, or other developments not foreseen in
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upheaval between the Revolution and the stabilization of the
Soviet currency in 1924 and the following period ending with the
credit reforms of 1930—1932 are discussed in Chapter 2, while
Chapter 8 describes the three more recent periods. Of these five
periods the first four, ending with the currency conversion of
1947, were characterized by almost continuous inflation at vary-
ing rates. The inability of the State Bank, even after the credit
reforms of 1930-1932, to prevent overspending of funds ear-
marked for wage disbursements contributed significantly to infla-
tionary pressures which could not be offset by other policies. In
contrast, after the currency conversion of 1947 designed to elimi-
nate the war-generated overhang of liquidity, prices declined in
markets alimented by the freely disposable food surpluses of
kolkhoz farmers and as a result of administrative cuts in state
stores as well. A period of declining consumer prices was fol-
lowed by virtual stability beginning with 1954, resulting in part
from a selective reduction of turnover taxes.
Concluding Observations
Despite the apparent success of the Soviet financial system in
keeping inflationary pressures in the postwar period within
bounds and official retail price indexes stable or declining, the
system's inability to allocate resources efficiently, to provide
incentives to increase productivity, and to respond to develop-
ments not anticipated in plans has been recognized. The Reform of
1965 was in part due to •this recognition. The modifications
announced at this time were limited in scope, however, and those
actually implemented, almost a decade later,still made only
modest advances. Indeed, there is evidence of backtracking on
some of the initial changes. Chapter 9 offers some explanations
for the failure of the Reform to modify the system significantly
and suggests some implications of this failure.
The example of most of the smaller socialist countries shows
that there is considerable room for developing a constructive
socialist monetary policy, even within the framework of a cen-
trally directed economy, and the failure of the Soviet Union to do
so no doubt accounts for the disappointing results of its economic10 Introduction
reforms. In some of the countries of Eastern Europe, the basic
characteristics of the Soviet monetary system—such as separa-
tion of the monetary circuits and the foreign exchange monop-
oly—have been retained, but negotiated credit extension has
been at least partly substituted for direct administrative guidance.
The emphasis in ranking has been shifted from accounting control
of plan fulfillment to the evaluation of efficient use of credit by
individual enterprises. In this process, banking has achieved a
considerablç degree of independence in developing credit stan-
dards, as well as in determining the amount of credit to be
extended in each case and in negotiating and enforcing specific
lending terms within the narrow range of alternatives available.
Much of the microeconomic control inherent in a centrally
planned economy has been shifted from ministerial bureaucracy
to bank offices, even though the basic structure of a monobank is
retained, and banks continue to operate within the limits of
centrally determined overall credit ceilings and an interest rate
structure that remains quite rigid.
In the Soviet Union, no such evolution has taken place as a
result of the Reform. In contrast to reforms introduced in Hun-
gary and, on a less ambitious scale, Poland, and attempted in
Czechoslovakia—all of which followed the earlier path-breaking
example of Yugoslavia—their goal has been merely to improve
some operational aspects of the centrally directed economy.
The greater flexibility toward which banking has evolved in
some of the socialist countries is part of their general effort to
introduce at least some of the elements of the market into a
centrally directed economy. They endeavor to find a workable
combination of essentially indicative planning with mechanisms
and processes that use the market place, its information potential,
and the feedbacks generated by consumer choice (and in some
instances, by producers' choice as well). The Soviet Union has
persisted in rejecting the possibility of replacing administrative
centralization with a socialist market. This rejection has limited
the objectives and scope of the reforms introduced in 1965. It
explains the retention of all those features which, since the credit
reforms of 1930—1932, have made the State Bank an integral part
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planners' objectives. The 1965 Reform reduced the range and
details of planning indicators, introduced limited feedbacks from
the market for consumer goods, placed greater emphasis on
financial incentives at the microeconomic level, and restructured
the costs entering into the administrative determination of prices.
One of the Reform's main features involved diverting at least part
of the financial flows away from nonreturnable grants, thus in-
creasing the role of credit in capital formation. It was expected
that increased and generalized use of financial incentives would
increaseefficiencyof investment, reduce wasteful use of
resources, and stimulate the labor force (above all, managerial
and technical staffs) to greater effort. Other aspects of the Soviet
financial system have been hardly touched by the Reform
(although some marginal changes had been taking place even
prior to its launching).
The reform of "economic steering," the official term designat-
ing the reforms of 1965, has put into relief the various limitations
of money and credit in a centrally directed economy that retains
central allocation of real resources. While it has shown that the
Soviet financial system can accommodate a restructuring of finan-
cial flows, it has, at the same time, demonstrated the limitations of
the role of money in a system in which administrative decisions
substitute for market processes and feedbacks are minimal.
Bank officials remain administrators of policies determined by
the central authorities and uniformly applied through the entire
system of the monobank. The reliance on the banking system for
monitoring the performance of the entire socialized economy has
not diminished; if anything, it has increased with the monetization
of the relationship between collective farms and the state that
began in the mid-fifties. While control by the forint in Hungary or
by the zloty in Poland has turned more and more into control
through the terms of credit extension, in the Soviet Union it is still
the flow of accounting data produced by the monobank that gives
the measure of its contribution to keeping the economy on the
beam, rather than the quality of decisions made by bank officials
on the firing line. In fact, there is no firing line; for the issuance of
credit, rather than having become a matter of negotiation between
bank and borrower, retains its strictly implementary and semiau-12 Introduction
tomatic character. The current generation of Soviet bank officials
differs from its predecessors of fifty years ago mainly in the
quality of their training, not in the scope of their jobs.
The failure of overall economic performance to improve under
the Reform provides no strong incentives for further experimenta- The
tion along the lines laid down in 1965. At the same time, it has
provided ammunition for those who have been opposing the Sovi
Reform from the very beginning, and has stiffened the bureau-
cratic resistance to any change inherent in centralized, adminis- H
tratively controlled economies.
The future development of Soviet banking and credit depends
on whether the Reform will remain a disappointing attempt to
increase the use of financial processes and pecuniary incentives
within the traditional framework of a centrally planned economy,
or whether challenges to economic performance in the years to
come will lead to efforts to combine central setting of overall goals
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